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THE EXPLOITATION OF LEGAL LOOPHOLES IN THE NAME OF
NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE STUDY ON
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
I. INTRODUCTION
During a layover in the United States, a thirty-three year-old man
named Maher Arar, a dual citizen of Syria and Canada, was detained,
denied his fundamental rights, and sent by U.S. authorities to Syria
where he was tortured.1 He fell victim to a program called "Extraor-
dinary Rendition." Arar recently brought his case before New York's
Eastern District Federal Court.' Because of foreign policy and na-
tional security considerations, the court continued a judicial posture of
deference to the executive branch by ruling in favor of the federal
government and not allowing Arar any redress for his injuries.3
This note will challenge the legality of the Extraordinary Rendi-
tion program by focusing on several key issues. First, the court erred
in ruling for the government in Arar v. Ashcroft' because foreign pol-
icy considerations and national security should not be an absolute bar
to receiving damages for a substantive due process violation of the
Fifth Amendment. Moreover, overturning the Arar v. Ashcroft deci-
sion and declaring that Arar's Fifth Amendment rights were violated
will help to challenge the legality of the Extraordinary Rendition pro-
gram in conjunction with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).
Second, current international and domestic laws governing the United
1. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
2. Id. at 250.
3. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 287. See generally United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
4. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250.
5. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006) [hereinafter
DTA].
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States' torture policies have not been interpreted or applied to prohibit
the Extraordinary Rendition program. Lastly, if the judiciary contin-
ues to defer to the executive and legislative branches in this policy
ambit, Congress must enact legislation prohibiting the Extraordinary
Rendition program. This note proposes the enactment of actionable
amendments to the DTA.
In the first section of this paper, the case of Arar v. Ascroft will be
discussed and its ruling will be disputed. The second section will go
over the current international and domestic laws governing torture in
the United States and provide evidence as to how the government has
circumvented the broad purposes of those laws by narrowly interpret-
ing them. Finally, the last section will propose legislation that will
expressly prohibit the Extraordinary Rendition program and allow
civil remedies for anyone injured by it.
II. ARAR v. ASHCROFT SHOULD BE OVERRULED
The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part, "No person shall be
• . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law... "6 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that some due process
rights are afforded to all people7 and that conduct by the government
that "shocks the conscience" violates substantive due process.8 In
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics,9 the U.S. Supreme Court created tort-like civil remedies for inju-
ries suffered as a result of a constitutional violation by the govern-
ment. 10  In this instance, Arar availed himself to sufficient
constitutional due process rights by entering the United States by way
of an airport layover while on his way to another country. The U.S.
government violated those rights by holding him captive in the United
States for ten days without adequate access to counsel or food and
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. See Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Jean v. Nel-
son, 472 U.S. 846, 873-79 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)) ("[E]xcludable aliens do
have due process rights.").
8. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (citing Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).
9. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
10. Id. at 397. The Court awarded money damages to the plaintiff to remedy
violations of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 395, 397.
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then by deporting him to Syria to be tortured." As a result of the
United States' actions, Arar suffered injuries.2 Therefore, Arar
should be afforded redress pursuant to the explicit purposes and spirit
of the Bivens decision.
In Bivens, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that six agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics arrested him in his home on the morn-
ing of November 26, 1965, without a warrant, in violation of his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal search and seizure. 3
The agents handcuffed Bivens "in front of his wife and children, and
threatened to arrest his entire family." 4 The agents then conducted a
warrantless search of his home. ' 5 The U.S. Supreme Court held that a
violation of the Fourth Amendment "by a federal agent acting under
color of his authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages con-
sequent upon his unconstitutional conduct."' 6 The high court prem-
ised its decision on three basic principles, one of which is particularly
relevant here. Specifically, damages are an appropriate remedy "for
injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by
federal officials .... ."I' In Arar however, the New York federal court
applied an exception to Bivens referred to as "special factors counsel-
ing hesitation"' 8 to avoid awarding him damages. 9 This note con-
tends that such an exception does not apply in this instance.
11. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
12. Id. at 254-56.
13. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 at 389-90, 397.
14. Id. at 389.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 395.
18. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983)) (recognizing "special factors coun-
seling hesitation" as an exception to Bivens).
19. Id. at 279-83. The court found that the "special factors counseling hesita-
tion" existed where the case gave rise to, among other things, "crucial national-
security and foreign policy considerations." Id. at 281. Further, the court opined
that this exception must apply when the court lacks "guidance or the authority of the
coordinate branches in whom the Constitution imposes responsibility for our foreign
affairs and national security." Id. at 283.
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A. Background of Extraordinary Rendition
The U.S. government has recently acknowledged its use of a prac-
tice called Extraordinary Rendition in which it "sends terrorism sus-
pects to third[-party] countries for interrogation."2  Extraordinary
Rendition has been defined by one group as the "transfer of an indi-
vidual, with the involvement of the United States or its agents, to a
foreign State in circumstances that make it more likely than not that
the individual will be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading ... treatment."'" The program has been created "as a means
of extraditing terrorism suspects" to states that use more "aggressive
methods of persuasion," including torture.22 It began as a small pro-
gram aimed at a distinct set of people and has come to include a broad
and poorly defined group described as "illegal enemy combatants. '23
The New York Times recently reported, citing unnamed former intelli-
gence officials, that the practice has been "widely used" since the
1990s and that "perhaps more than 100 cases" have arisen since Sep-
tember 11, 2001.24
Some of the men, including Arar, who were subject to Extraordi-
nary Rendition have now been released and are speaking out about
20. Outsourcing Torture: The Legality of Extraordinary Rendition, Center
News, 12 No. 3 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 46, 46 (2005).
21. ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION &
CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. SCH. OF LAW, TORTURE BY
PROXY: INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS" 6
(Dec. 2005), available at http://www.extraordinaryrendition.org/data/APPG_ NYU_
BriefingPaper.pdf [hereinafter TORTURE BY PROXY]; accord David Weissbrodt &
Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 123, 127 (2006) (characterizing Extraordinary Rendition as a "hybrid
human rights violation, combining elements of arbitrary arrest, enforced disappear-
ance, forcible transfer, torture, denial of access to consular officials, and denial of
impartial tribunals.").
22. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Ex-
traordinary Rendition" Program, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106.
23. Id. at 107.
24. Douglas Jehl, Senate May Open Inquiry Into C.I.A. 's Handling of Suspects,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at 15; see also Mayer, supra note 22, at 107 (reporting
an expert's estimate that 150 cases have occurred since September 11, 2001); Kathe-
rine R. Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic Assurances and the Legal-
ity of "Rendition," 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 213, 241 (2006) (estimating the number of
cases since 2001 to be between 100 and 200); Weissbrodt, supra note 21, at 125
(stating that the U.S. Extraordinary Rendition "program has accelerated since Sep-
tember 11, 2001.").
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what they endured, blowing the cover off this covert program. An-
other known case involves Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, who reportedly was
taken out of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) custody by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and shipped to Egypt, where he
promptly gave bad information about the use of chemical weapons in
Iraq. 25 Another suspected victim of Extraordinary Rendition is Hassan
Mustafa Osama Nasr.26 Nasr disappeared from Milan in February of
2003.27 Italian prosecutors believe that "Nasr was flown from Italy to
a military base in Germany before being" sent to Egypt where he was
subsequently tortured on behalf of the CIA. 8 In 2005 alone, an Italian
judge issued up to forty-one arrest warrants for alleged CIA agents in
connection with the kidnapping.29
In February of 2006, police and prosecutors in Munich opened in-
vestigations into the abduction of Khaled el-Masri. 30 Masri was ar-
rested on December 31, 2003, in Macedonia and taken to a prison in
Kabul, where he says he was mistaken as a terrorist and tortured for
five months. 3' German officials are investigating whether the German
embassy in Macedonia was informed about the arrest and did nothing
to help Masri and whether the German government was giving aid to
the United States, specifically, to the Extraordinary Rendition pro-
gram.32 Finally, in England, Sir Menzies Campbell, a political opposi-
tion leader, has called for an investigation "into allegations that British
intelligence officers participated in the interrogation of' terrorism sus-
pects abducted in Greece and sent to various Middle-Eastern countries
after the bombings in London in July of 2005.13 In this instance, im-
25. Mayer, supra note 22, at 114-15.
26. Italy Seeks Arrests in Kidnapping Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A5.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (stating that the Italian judge issued twenty-two warrants in December
of 2005); TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 21, at 7 (stating that the Italian judge is-
sued nineteen warrants between June and July of 2005).
30. Don Van Natta Jr., Germany Weighs if It Played Role in Seizure by U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at Al.
31. Id.; see generally Gary Williams, Indefinite Detention and Extraordinary
Rendition, 29 L.A. LAWYER 44, 48 (Sept. 2006).
32. Van Natta, supra note 30, at Al.
33. Alan Cowell, World Briefing Europe: Britain: Callfor Inquiry into Torture
Claim, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2005, at A.
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plicit parallels have been drawn between these allegations and the
United States' Extraordinary Rendition program.34
B. Case Summary35
On September 26, 2002, returning from vacation in Tunisia, Arar
arrived at in New York's John F. Kennedy Airport for a brief lay-
over.36 Upon showing his identification to an immigration inspector,
Arar was apprehended and interrogated for eight hours regarding his
suspected affiliations with Osama Bin Laden and terrorist organiza-
tions and activities.37 Arar was kept overnight and transferred to the
Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York,
"where he was strip searched and placed in solitary confinement. 3 8
Arar was held at the MDC until October 8, 2002, when he was de-
ported to Syria against his will.39 During Arar's ten-month detention
in Syria he was kept in a rat-infested cell dampened by constant cat
urine permeating through the ceiling and subjected to brutal torture
and interrogations. n0 On October 5, 2003, Syrian officials released
Arar to Canadian officials without filing any charges against him.4'
Arar subsequently filed a lawsuit against U.S. Attorney General
John Ashcroft and other associated parties.42 The Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of New York recently heard the case and
dismissed Arar's action. 3 The court held that: 1) Arar lacked standing
to bring a claim against U.S. officials for violating his Due Process
rights; 2) as an alien, Arar cannot meet statutory requirements for a
34. Id.
35. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The court
considered the defendant's motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure sections 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Id. These rules require that the "court accepts
as true all the factual allegations in the complaint and must draw reasonable infer-
ences in favor of the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Lunney v. United States, 319 F.3d 550,
554 (2d Cir. 2003)); see generally Hawkins, supra note 24, at 222-27; Williams, su-
pra note 31, at 48.
36. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 253.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 254.
40. Id. at 254-55.
41. Id. at 255.
42. Id. at 250.
43. Id. at 287-88.
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1 [2006], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol37/iss1/4
2006] A CASE STUDY ON EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION 127
cause of action under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA); and
3) although Immnigration and Nationality Act's (INA) jurisdiction did
not preclude a Bivens claim, a remedy under Bivens is barred by na-
tional-security and foreign policy considerations.' The third holding,
in effect, defers to the executive branch instead of providing civil
remediation 5 and is a primary focus of this note.
III. ARAR'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS WAS VIOLATED
A. Arar's Due Process Rights Were Violated While He Was Held
Captive in the United States
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics stands for the proposition that damages may be awarded for
injuries resulting from a constitutional violation by the U.S. govern-
ment.46 A comparison of Arar and Bivens shows that in both instances
government agents exercised an extreme abuse of unmitigated power
under the color of federal law to violate the plaintiffs' respective con-
stitutional rights. In Arar's case, after being held captive for over ten
days by federal officials, Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) Regional Officer Blackman ordered Aar to be sent to Syria in
accordance with "Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment."47 INS officers explicitly told Aar the INS "was not gov-
erned by the 'Geneva Conventions.' 48 These actions and statements
show that Aar was apprehended, detained and transferred under the
color of U.S. law. In Bivens, the U.S. Supreme Court found the gov-
ernment agents to be acting under the color of law when they used
their authority as FBI agents to enter the home and conduct the illegal
search.49
44. Id. at 287.
45. See generally id. at 279-83 (analyzing the "special factors counseling hesi-
tation" exception to Bivens and concluding that this exception applies to Arar's
claim).
46. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
47. Arar, 414 F. Supp 2d at 254.
48. Id.
49. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, 394-95.
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Agents acting unlawfully under the color of law were particularly
troubling to the Court because they possess a far greater capacity for
harm.50 Justice Brennan took on this problem by referring to several
historical cases: "'The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury."'' "The mere invocation of federal
power by a federal law enforcement official will normally render fu-
tile any attempt to resist an unlawful entry or arrest. '5 2
"In such cases there is no safety for the citizen, except in the pro-
tection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded
by the officers of the government, professing to act in its name.
There remains to him but the alternative of resistance, which may
amount to crime.- 53
Arar's fundamental due process rights were violated when he was
held in the United States and interrogated without counsel for five
hours; kept in solitary confinement in a room always lit and without a
bed; and, over the course of two days, only given one meal, cold food
from McDonald's 4 Arar was then transported to the MDC where the
INS initiated removal procedures.55 Five days after his detainment
Arar was allowed to make one phone call, and four days following
that he was allowed one meeting with an attorney.5 6 There is little
guidance regarding the rights of a non-citizen "'passing through the
United States' on his way to Canada' 57 with no intent to enter. 18
However, even if considered an "excludable alien,"5 9 which is de-
fined as an alien lacking the proper papers to enter the United States,'
50. Id. at 392.
51. Id. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)).
52. Id. at 394 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 386 (1914)).
53. Id. at 394-95 (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 219 (1882)).
54. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 284.
58. See e.g. id. at 275-77 (factually distinguishing previous cases from the facts
surrounding Arar's status in the United States before his capture).
59. See id. (referring to Afar as a potentially "excludable alien"); Amanullah v.
Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated as moot 872 F.2d 11 (lst Cir. 1989).
60. See Amanullah, 811 F.2d at 5 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982) (current ver-
sion at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006)) (defining excludable aliens as: "[t]hose aliens who
lack the (valid) documentation which [8 U.S.C. § 1182] contemplates are subject to
8
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Arar would still "have personal constitutional protections" 6' such as
not being beaten by police officers or having the death penalty arbi-
trarily imposed.62 Therefore, if an excludable alien was subjected to
the same treatment as Arar, he or she would have a tenable cause of
action against the U.S. government for constitutional violations.63 In
this case, Arar's standing should exceed that of an excludable alien
because he had no intention of gaining access to the United States. A
mere stroke of airline convenience put Arar in the United States' ju-
risdiction.
Following that logic, a non-citizen temporarily present in the
United States as the result of a travel layover should enjoy sufficient
constitutional protections to avoid being put in a situation similar to
Arar. Nevertheless, the U.S. agents forced Arar to endure lengthy and
aggressive interrogations; denied Arar access to food, counsel, and
communication; and forced Arar to travel around the world to face in-
evitable torture. In totality, these actions "shock the conscience"' and
therefore violate the Fifth Amendment.65
B. Arar's Fifth Amendment Rights Were Violated When He Was
Tortured Abroad
Upon arriving in Syria, Arar alleged that he was subjected to ex-
cruciating torture.66 This included being placed in a cell only three
feet wide for ten months; being "beaten on his palms, hips and lower
back with a two-inch-thick electrical cable"; being beaten on his
stomach, face, and back of his neck by his captors' fists; and being
forced to listen to the screams of other detainees as they were put in a
exclusion ... ").
61. Id. at 9.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 166, 172 (1952). The court found
that law enforcement officers' behavior "shocks the conscience" when the officers
ordered physicians to force emetic solution into petitioner's stomach via tube in or-
der to induce vomiting-up of morphine pills that petitioner was suspected of swal-
lowing. Id. Similarly, the district court should have found that the INS agents' ac-
tions towards Arar "shock the conscience."
65. See id. (holding that behavior that "shocks the conscience" violate the Due
Process clause).
66. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254-55 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
129
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spine-breaking chair and hung upside-down in a tire for beatings and
electric shocks.67
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed
a similar situation in Harbury v. Deutch.68 In that case, a widow
brought a Bivens action alleging that the CIA tortured and murdered
her husband, a Guatemalan citizen.69 Circuit Judge Tatel framed the
issue as "whether the Fifth Amendment prohibits torture of non-
resident foreign nationals living abroad. '7° In an earlier case, Rochin
v. California,7' the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether torture can
be used to extract evidence to help a criminal prosecution. 2 The Ro-
chin court held that actions taken by the U.S. government that
"shock[] the conscience" 73 violate the subject's Due Process rights.74
Applying the Rochin test in Harbury, Judge Tatel concluded, "[n]o
one doubts that under Supreme Court precedent, interrogation by tor-
ture like that alleged by Harbury shocks the conscience. ' 75 Despite
this conclusion, the court denied Harbury's claim because her husband
''was not physically present in the United States; not tortured in a
country in which the United States exercised de facto political control;
and not abducted for trial in a United States court."76
The Bivens court ultimately followed United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,7 7 which ruled that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
the search by American authorities of the Mexican residence of a
Mexican citizen and resident who had no voluntary attachment to the
United States. 78  However, both of these cases are patently distin-
guishable from Arar.
67. Id.
68. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
69. Id. at 598.
70. Id. at 602.
71. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
72. See generally id. at 166-68.
73. Id. at 172.
74. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-73; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
75. Harbury, 233 F.3d at 602 (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172).
76. Id. at 604.
77. Id. at 603 (finding that "Verdugo-Urquidez controls this case"); see United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
78. Harbury, 233 F.3d at 602-03 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262-
10
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Unlike the injured parties in both Verdugo-Urquidez and Harbury,
Arar's deprivation of rights was initiated in the United States by U.S.
officials under the color of U.S. law.79 Aar was initially held captive
at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City and then transferred to
the MDC in Brooklyn before being deported by the INS.8 Arar ada-
mantly objected to being deported to Syria, citing the torture that he
would inevitably face. 8' However, on October 8, 2002, Arar was
taken on a small jet to Jordan and handed over to Syrian officials.8 2
Evidenced by Arar's personal statements, Syrian guards subjected him
to excruciating pain, discomfort, and necessity deprivation in order to
extract information for the United States.83
The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a ruling that hopefully
begins a trend of maintaining constitutional standards while operating
abroad. In Rasul v. Bush,' fourteen non-citizens "captured abroad
during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban" chal-
lenged the legality of their detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base in Cuba.8 5 The Court held that federal district courts have juris-
diction over habeas challenges, as well as claims asserted under fed-
eral question jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Statute, from aliens held
at Guantanamo Bay.86 Jurisdiction over these claims exists because
the United States has jurisdiction over the Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base, and no distinction should be drawn between aliens and U.S. citi-
zens.87 While recognizing that the United States' power and control
over Guantanamo Bay is significantly more than the control over Syr-
ian officials, this jurisdictional extension concerning the rights of de-
tained aliens lends support to the condemnation of the happenings in
this case. The fact that the questioning by the Syrians was consistent
with that of FBI and INS officials is convincing evidence that the Syr-
ian government was acting in concert with or on behalf of the United
79. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
80. Id. at 254.
81. Id. at 253.
82. Id. at 254.
83. Id. at 255.
84. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
85. Id. at 470-7 1.
86. Id. at 483-85. The Alien Tort Statute the court is referring to is the Torture
Victim's Protection Act of 1991. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2006).
87. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480-81.
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States.88 It is also telling that any information obtained would be
given to U.S. officials.89 Therefore, the United States could likely
have prevented or stopped the torture from taking place, which goes
towards the extent of control the U.S. government had over the torture
of Arar. Such control should ultimately be considered when assessing
the United States' liability.
C. The "Special Factors Counseling Hesitation" Exception to Bivens
is Not Applicable to this Case
A Bivens remedy is unavailable when the "special factors counsel-
ing hesitation" exists.9" The factors Judge Trager relied on to deter-
mine whether the exception applied were national security and foreign
policy.91 He used these factors because these matters are "properly
left to the political branches of government."92 Since the beginning of
the "war on terror," "Congress has remained essentially silent about
the [Bush] Administration's harsh measures for detaining and interro-
gating terrorist suspects. 93 However, the executive branch's duty to
provide national security must be offset by Congress' duty to maintain
civil liberties and freedoms. Congress is designated with this respon-
sibility because its members represent the views and feelings of citi-
zens across the nation. 94 However, when the executive and legislative
branches act in concert and fail to uphold the law, the judiciary must
insert its "check" as a governmental branch of authority.
Judge Trager writes, "Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution
places the regulation of aliens squarely within the authority of the
Legislative branch." 95 However, the issues relevant to this case begin
with the unlawful detainment of a person while he was transferring
between international flights in New York City on his way to Can-
ada. 96 At no time did Arar attempt to enter the United States and at no
88. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 279 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983)).
91. Id. at 281.
92. Id.; see also Williams, supra note 31, at 48.
93. Michael Greenberger, The Missing Link: Congress Has Shirked Its Consti-
tutional Duties and Floundered in the War on Terror, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct.
2005.
94. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I.
95. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
96. See id. at 253.
12
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time was he even legally on U.S. soil until he was captured.97 In short,
at no time was Arar an alien in the United States by his own volition.
Arar's status in the United States is currently undefined by U.S. law,
and therefore, this situation may fall outside of the Congressional
power to regulate aliens under Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Consti-
tution.98
Also, Judge Trager concludes, since Congress has not yet pro-
vided a specific cause of action for those in a similar position as Arar,
and has not taken an "affirmative position" 99 on federal court review
of rendition issues, it is reasonable to infer that no such review can oc-
cur."° However, this is completely contrary to the precedent set in
Bell v. Hood,' which stated: "where federally protected rights have
been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will
be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."' °
The Bell Court concluded that federal courts indeed have jurisdiction
to hear claims for damages arising out of violations of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments and other federal laws."0 3 The lack of a congres-
sional stance pertaining to the redress for deprivation of constitutional
rights should not be determinative when evaluating whether a cause of
action for damages can be sustained. To the contrary, it can be rea-
sonably assumed that courts of appropriate jurisdiction are in the best
position to decide whether one's constitutional rights have been vio-
lated and what remedies should be levied.
Judge Trager also explains that, while judges have the training
and experience to evaluate decision-making of federal officials "in the
domestic context, ' ' "°4 few, if any, have adequate background to make
similar determinations regarding foreign affairs, "especially in cir-
cumstances involving countries that do not accept our nation's values
or may be assisting those out to destroy us."'0 5 He opines, "[T]he task
of balancing individual rights against national-security concerns is one
that courts should not undertake without the guidance or the authority
97. See id. at 284-85.
98. See id. at 271. "The Congress shall have Power . To establish an [sic]
uniform Rule of Naturalization. ... " U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8 cl. 4.
99. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
100. Id.
101. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 684-85.
104. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
105. Id.
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of the coordinate branches .... To do otherwise would threaten 'our
customary policy of deference to the President in matters of foreign
affairs.' 10 6 Such logic is hard to reconcile. It should not be the
United States' policy that, merely because other countries participate
in an action with the United States, federal judges are precluded from
upholding and enforcing the Constitution. Additionally, the President
should not have unrestricted, unilateral authority to violate the Consti-
tution so long as his actions are couched in terms of "foreign af-
fairs." 107
Judge Trager's decision goes on to include within the analysis of
the "special factors counseling hesitation" exception 0 8 the potential
embarrassment that would result for the United States, Canada, and
other participating nations, should the details of these programs be
disclosed to the public." He writes that "extending a Bivens remedy
'could significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to re-
spond to foreign situations involving our national interest."'1" 0 To al-
low the remedy risks "'embarrass[ing] . . . our government abroad'
through 'multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.'"". However, "Americans and our government have his-
torically condemned states that torture; we have granted asylum or
refuge to those who fear it.""' 2 So now that the United States seem-
ingly endorses a torturous-type program, the embarrassment of hypoc-
risy must not prevent the judiciary from condemning it.
Additionally, the case law cited by Judge Trager in support of this
logic is distinguishable from the matter at hand. In Sanchez-Espinoza
v. Reagan, appellants were seeking damages because the United States
106. Id. at 283 (quoting Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543
U.S. 335, 384 (2005)).
107. See Hawkins, supra note 24, at 268. Article II § 3 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion "states that the President 'shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
Id. Thus the executive branch has a good faith obligation to comply with the Con-
vention Against Torture, even if the judiciary lacks the power to enforce compli-
ance. Id.
108. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
109. Id. at 281-82.
110. Id. at 281-82 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
273-274 (1990)).
111. Id. at 281-82 (quoting Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208
(D.C. Cir. 1985)).
112. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV.
1425, 1425 (2005).
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supported forces bearing arms against the government of Nicaragua. 3
In evaluating whether the allegations were redressable pursuant to
Bivens the court stated that "as a general matter the danger of foreign
citizens' using the courts... to obstruct the foreign policy of our gov-
ernment is sufficiently acute that we must leave to Congress the
judgment whether a damage remedy should exist.""' 4  However,
unlike in Arar, in Sanchez-Espinoza all of the activities giving rise to
the allegations happened outside of the United States' jurisdiction.
Also, the allegations against the American government were conspir-
acy-like in nature and Nicaraguan operatives carried out the alleged
acts. 1 6 In contrast, Arar is seeking damages for conduct that clearly
began on U.S. soil and was planned and carried out by U.S. agents." 7
Therefore, the "special factors counseling hesitation" exception" 18
used in Sanchez-Espinoza to foreclose Bivens remedies is not syn-
onymously applicable to Arar v. Ashcroft.
In conclusion, allowing Arar to sue the federal government for
violating his rights may indeed cause the United States and its accom-
plices great embarrassment. However, if the transparency of govern-
ment activity causes embarrassment, then the government is likely act-
ing in a way that cannot be squared with the attitudes of the American
people and its allies. The United States' moral and ethical turpitude
should not be subordinated to potential international embarrassment. '9
Arar v. Ashcroft must be overturned in order to provide Arar adequate
remediation for his injuries and because doing so would be a signifi-
cant step towards terminating the Extraordinary Rendition program.
113. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 204.
114. Id. at 209.
115. Id. at 205-06; Arar, 414 F. Supp 2d at 253.
116. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 205.
117. Arar, 414 F. Supp 2d at 253.
118. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 208 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 298 (1983)).
119. To the contrary, international embarrassment has traditionally been used
as a "tool for preventing or discouraging human rights violations ...." Weissbrodt
& Bergquist, supra note 21, at 153. When the international community learns of
such violations it "can exert pressure on the offending governments to halt their
practice." Id.
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IV. CURRENT LAW DOES NOT EFFECTIVELY PROHIBIT THE
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION PROGRAM
A. The United Nations Convention Against Torture is Ineffective
Because it Has Been Interpreted to Allow Torturous Acts to be
Outsourced to Nations Not Governed by the Convention
Under international law, states are prohibited from sending a per-
son to a territory where it is believed that he will be tortured. 20 This
obligation is commonly referred to as the non-refoulement principle.'
Specifically, the primary legal governance of all types of domestic and
international torture sponsored by the United States is the United Na-
tions Convention Against Torture (CAT).122 The objective of the CAT
is to criminalize all acts of torture by its signatories. 23 Article 3(1) of
CAT states: "No State Party shall, expel, return ... or extradite a per-
son to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.' ' 24 CAT
generally defines torture as the infliction of severe physical and/or
mental suffering committed under the color of law 25 and allows for no
circumstances or emergencies where torture is permitted. 26 With re-
gard to Extraordinary Rendition, the CAT protections are supposed to
apply when actions taken by its signatories "lead to a 'substantial like-
lihood' of a danger of torture that is greater than 'mere suspicion,' but
the likelihood does not have to rise to a level of 'high probability.""2 7
Unfortunately, when interpreting CAT's statutory construction,
the U.S. government has determined that an agent or representative of
a signatory must have "substantial grounds for believing" a suspect
120. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
121. See id; Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 21, at 142, 145.
122. See Michael John Garcia, U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Over-
view and Application to Interrogation Techniques, Congressional Research Service
Report for Congress, Feb. 10, 2005, at 5.
123. CAT, supra note 120, Summary.
124. Id. art. 3 para. I (emphasis added).
125. Id. art. 1 para. 1; see also Garcia, U.N. Convention Against Torture, supra
note 122, at 1-2.
126. CAT, supra note 121, at art. 2 para 2; see also Garcia, U.N. Convention
Against Torture, supra note 122, at 3.
127. TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 21, at 9.
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will be tortured to be in violation.128 Martin Lederman, a former law-
yer for the Department of Justice, stated, "The [CAT] only applies
when you know a suspect is more likely than not to be tortured, but
what if you kind of know? That's not enough. So there are ways to
get around it.'1 29 Put another way, "for a public official to acquiesce
to an act of torture, that official must, 'prior to the activity constituting
torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or
her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity."'" 3" In
sum, pursuant to CAT the United States and other CAT signatories
can negligently allow for torturous acts to be committed by foreign
nations so long as their actions do not rise to a level of willfulness.
Proving that the government has a subjective intention to have a for-
eign nation torture a detainee is a hard burden to overcome when as-
sessing the legality of rendition cases.
The facts in Arar v. Ashcroft give strong evidence of the U.S.
government's awareness of the ways to circumvent the CAT and a
wanton disregard for its broad purpose. Upon deportation, Arar was
orally informed that his removal to Syria was in compliance with Ar-
ticle 3 of the CAT,"' and while Arar pleaded for reconsideration the
INS officials told him that the Geneva Conventions did not govern the
agency. 132 Those statements go towards the individual officials'
awareness of international torture laws. Also, to further attenuate the
causal chain between the actions of the United States and the torture
by the Syrians, Arar was placed in the hands of the Jordanians, who
subsequently handed him over to the Syrians. 133 This was likely done
to reduce the perceived foreseeability of Arar's eventual torture.
Thus, it is almost impossible to implicate the United States pursuant to
the CAT according to the language prohibiting the acquiescence of
torture by other countries.
B. Current Executive Policy Supports Extraordinary Rendition
Notwithstanding the CAT and Other International Treaties
Armed with experienced lawyers, the Bush Administration con-
tinues to rebuke notions of impropriety with the need for executive
128. Mayer, supra note 22, at 107-08.
129. Id. at 108.
130. Garcia, supra note 122, at 6.
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deference in the name of national security. Attorney General Alberto
Gonzalez, a Harvard graduate and former member of the Texas Su-
preme Court,' 34 argued during his confirmation hearings that CAT's
ban on "cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment" of suspects does
not apply to American interrogations overseas.'35 Also, in what has
been referred to as the "Gonzalez Memo," the Attorney General gave
support to his legal opinion that provisions of the Geneva Conventions
do not apply generally to the war on terror.'36 He writes, "In my judg-
ment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations
on questioning of enemy prisoners."' 137 He went on to discuss how be-
ing outside of the Geneva Conventions' limitations also reduces the
chances of U.S. officials being convicted of war crimes.'38 John C.
Yoo, a Yale Law School Graduate and former clerk for Supreme
Court Justice Clarence Thomas, advised President Bush that Geneva
Conventions restrictions could be avoided by creating a new label for
opposition forces: "illegal enemy combatants."1 39 This term was used
in place of the current categories of "civilians" and "prisoners of war"
because the new opposition was not from "regular foreign armed
forces,"' 4 but rather from a "failed state."'' He goes on to say,
"[t]hey can't prevent the president from ordering torture" and that the
people of the United States implicitly agreed with the president's ac-
tions as commander-in-chief, including the use of tortuous programs,
when he was reelected in 2004. 142
134. The Nomination of the Honorable Alberto Gonzalez: Hearing Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 109th Cong. 121 (2005) available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53883-2005Jan6_2.html [herein-
after Gonzalez] (statement of Alberto Gonzalez, Nominee).
135. Id.
136. Memorandum from Alberto Gonzalez, White House Counsel to the Presi-




139. Mayer, supra note 22, at 112.
140. See Gonzalez Memo, supra note 136.
141. Mayer, supra note 22, at 112.
142. Id.
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C. The DTA (Incorporating the McCain Amendment
and the Graham-Levin Amendment on Detainees)
Does Not Address Extraordinary Rendition
Section 2000dd of the DTA states, in pertinent part:
(a) In General. - No individual in the custody or under the physical
control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality
or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment. (b) Construction. - Nothing in this
section shall be construed to impose any geographical limitation on
the applicability of the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment under this section ... (d) Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Defined -...
means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment
prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States. 1
43
The limitations of this language are evident. The phrase, "in the
custody or under the physical control of the United States Govern-
ment," 1' does not apply to the actual, concrete injuries suffered as a
result of the torture committed once a detainee is handed over to a
sovereign nation. So, when taken literally, Arar is not entitled to
remediation from the United States for the suffering brought upon him
once he was in control of the Syrians even if he was handed over by
the U.S. government to be tortured.
The language of subsection (d) defines cruel treatment within the
context of the Constitution. Since only U.S. citizens are availed to the
full privileges of the U.S. Constitution, different standards of treat-
ment will inevitably be applied when determining what is cruel, in-
humane and degrading (CID). Therefore, the U.S. government may
be able to subject non-citizens to a higher degree of CID treatment
than citizens. Section 2000dd(d) of the DTA seems to suggest that
non-citizens have less human rights than U.S. citizens 145 and thus can
be subjected to some forms of torture. Consequently, citizenship be-
comes a proxy by which standards of decency and humanity should be
143. DTA, supra note 5, § 2000dd.
144. Id.
145. See id. While subsection (a) of this statute applies to all individuals, sub-
section (d) limits the definition of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment to apply only to those individuals who are protected by the Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Therefore, the statute could exclude aliens.
139
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applied. Additionally, there are no enforcement or liability provisions
within the statutory body of the DTA.'4 In order to combat this hy-
pocrisy the U.S. judiciary must interpret the Fifth Amendment to pro-
tect citizens and non-citizens alike from the Extraordinary Rendition
program. Once deemed a Fifth Amendment violation, Extraordinary
Rendition will fit squarely under the definition of CID treatment, thus
illegalizing it and aiding in the termination of its existence.
V. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST TAKE INITIATIVE TO BAN THE
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION PROGRAM
A. Proposed Statutory Amendment
To coincide with the overturning of Arar v. Ashcroft, Congress
must amend the DTA to definitively prohibit the Extraordinary Rendi-
tion program. The executive branch's determination that the Geneva
Conventions do not apply to the war on terror 4 7 compels the creation
of domestic laws that uphold the Constitution and prevent the torture
and CID treatment of all people. The goals of this legislation must be
to prohibit torture in all forms. This includes prohibiting the aiding
and abetting of torture, conspiracy to torture, and all CID treatment.
In addition, there must be an express prohibition of any transfer, or re-
location of any detainee to a country where that individual is likely to
be tortured.
The definition section of the DTA should be amended to read as
follows:
Definitions-
"United States government" includes any agents acting under the
authority of the laws of the United States or at the behest of the
U.S. government.
"Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" means the
cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited
by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and the transfer, relocation, or movement
of any individual to any country where he or she may be subjected
to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, either
authorized or unauthorized, by the government of that country.
146. See id.
147. Gonzalez Memo, supra note 136.
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Civil liability shall be assessed to the U.S. government for the
commission of, or acquiescence to, any violation of this statute.
B. Implications of the Amended Statute
Expanding the reach of this statute to all agents or anyone acting
under the authority of the U.S. government will prevent the use of pri-
vate citizen groups or third-party organizations from carrying out tor-
turous programs. Instituting the phrase "may be subjected" is in-
tended to deter the movement of a detainee to any country where they
can reasonably be expected to be tortured. This language lessens the
standard of knowledge from a substantial likelihood to one of reason-
ableness. This statute will mandate greater diligence when evaluating
the likelihood that certain governments or other groups will torture a
detainee transferred to another country. Lastly, the ability to hold all
responsible parties liable is essential in order to make the statute en-
forceable.
Such a law would be consistent with existing international doc-
trines addressing the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians.
The transfer of a prisoner of war (POW) to a State where the POW
is likely to be tortured or inhumanely treated is a violation of Ge-
neva III .... The unlawful transfer of a civilian classified as a "pro-
tected person" to such a State has harsher consequences-the trans-
fer is a "grave breach" under Geneva IV, and is a criminal act....
The 1951 Refugee Convention also affords protection against re-
foulement to individuals with a "well-founded fear of persecution"
on identified grounds.'48
Opponents of this legislation will rely on precedent and theory
similar to that in Arar, in particular, deference to the executive branch
when dealing with national security and foreign policy. Also, the
statute may be viewed as inhibiting the military's ability to be autono-
mous and flexible when fighting wars, thus disturbing some of the un-
fettered ability of the executive branch to circumvent existing doctrine
and torture terror suspects. As a result, those in support of the current
executive posture will be in opposition to this amendment. However,
148. TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 21, at 10. In addition to criminal penal-
ties for unlawful transfer, "[c]ountries seeking to avoid the responsibility to prose-
cute officials responsible for grave breaches may themselves be violating the Ge-
neva Conventions." Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 21, at 156.
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these views are superseded by the need for a distinct denouncement
and illegalization of the Extraordinary Rendition program so as to
prevent torture worldwide.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ruling handed down by Judge Trager of New York's Eastern
District Federal Court in Arar v. Ashcroft was an abdication of the ju-
diciary's responsibility to condemn constitutional and human rights
violations by the U.S. government. Extraordinary Rendition is de-
signed to exploit deficiencies in the current anti-torture laws. As the
debate about torture rages on in America, the government has taken
steps to appease those opposed to torture with new legislation. How-
ever to date, U.S. regulations, both old and new, do not stop officials
and agents from deporting non-citizens to countries where they can be
lawfully tortured on behalf of the U.S. government.
The U.S. government violated Maher Arar's constitutional and
human rights. For that he should receive adequate compensation.
However, the broad reverberations of remediation for Arar exceed in
importance far beyond the typical tort intentions of making him indi-
vidually whole. It will be a step towards eliminating the covert opera-
tion of Extraordinary Rendition. Furthermore, Congress must take an
aggressive stance and institute legislation banning such programs from
existence. Ending Extraordinary Rendition will promote the United
States as a supporter of all human rights and a fair player in the war
against terror.
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